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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.,*
Thomas A. Graves,** and A. Erin Dwyer***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Sur-
vey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
With the failure of several federally insured savings and loan associations
in Texas' and the appointment of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) as receiver for those associations, the FSLIC and the
courts of this state continue to engage in a jurisdictional tug-of-war. 2 The
FSLIC argues relying on federal enactments, 3 that its appointment as a re-
ceiver ousts the Texas state courts of jurisdiction to hear claims involving the
failed association. The FSLIC instead claims that it has the exclusive power
to adjudicate those claims. 4 The FSLIC's opponents perceive it as less than
impartial in deciding claims involving such an association. Furthermore,
FSLIC jurisdiction would deprive those opponents of a jury trial. Thus, the
FSLIC's opponents usually challenge the FSLIC's jurisdiction.
In FSLIC v. Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. 5 the Federal Home Loan
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
1. See, e.g., Glidden, Portrait of an Industry in Crisis, D MAGAZINE, May 1987, at 94;
Area S&L Declared Insolvent, Dallas Morning News, May 21, 1987, at Al, col. 2; Losses Leave
S&L Insolvent, Dallas Times Herald, Sept. 5, 1986, at Al, col. 3; The Fall of an Empire-
Auditors Untangle Web of Records to Find S&L Insolvent, Dallas Times Herald, Mar. 25, 1984,
at KI, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., Summertree Venture III v. FSLIC, 742 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d 374
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1986), writ ref'd per curiam, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988); FSLIC v. Ken-
nedy, 732 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see generally
Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 1,
523-25 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Annual Survey] (discussing FSLIC jurisdiction).
3. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C) (1982) (provides that "no court may... retain or affect
the exercise of powers or functions of a receiver [i.e., FSLIC]); Id. § 1729(d) (provides that
"[iun connection with the liquidation of insured institutions, the [FSLIC] shall [be] ... subject
only to the regulation of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.").
4. See Felt, FSLIC Receivership Claims Procedures, 1987 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
FAILING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 529 (setting forth Federal Home Loan Bank Board proce-
dures when FSLIC is receiver).
5. 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).
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Bank Board (FHLBB) appointed the FSLIC receiver of a failed association
while claims against the association were still pending. Enjoying success
with its federal statutory argument, the FSLIC persuaded the state trial
court to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal,
the court of appeals disagreed and held the federal enactments unconstitu-
tional. The court concluded that the enactments violated article III of the
United States Constitution.6 The FSLIC sought review of the matter by the
Texas Supreme Court. The agency argued that the state courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction and that it had exclusive initial. jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims administratively. 7 Avoiding the constitutional question8 and joining
with an earlier federal decision,9 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that
under the federal statutory scheme the courts retain power to adjudicate
claims, not the FSLIC as receiver.' 0 Since the United States Supreme Court
currently has the question under advisement in another case, an authorita-
tive decision is likely to issue in the near future.
Texas courts have also considered recent amendments to state statutes
conferring subject matter jurisdiction. A recent case, Pearson v. K-Mart Cor-
poration,'2 interprets the 1985 amendment to section 5A(b) of the Texas
Probate Code, which adds the language "[i]n actions by or against a personal
representative .... the statutory probate courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts."' 3 The personal representative of a ward and his
estate asserted a tort claim in the statutory probate court to recover for per-
sonal injuries to the ward. The probate court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Reversing the
dismissal on appeal, the court of appeals construed amended section 5A(b)
"to allow the personal representative bringing a cause of action on behalf of
the estate to elect between the probate court or the district court for any
cause of action, liquidated or unliquidated, contract or tort.'" 4 According
to the court, the amendment overrules the decision of the Texas Supreme
Court in Seay v. Hall,'5 which had earlier held that the probate court lacked
jurisdiction over wrongful death or survival actions that sought to recover
6. See Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. FSLIC, 734 S.W.2d at 390.
7. 750 S.W.2d at 758.
8. Id. at 759.
9. Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int'l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. pending sub noma. FSLIC v. Stevenson Ass'n, 811 F.2d 1209, 55 U.S.L.W. 2481 (9th Cir.
1987). Contra Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564-65 (5th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105, 99 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1988); FSLIC v.
Bonfanti, 826 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. pending sub nor. Zohdi v. FSLIC, No. 87-
255 (U.S. filed Aug. 5, 1987); Chupik Corp. v. FSLIC, 790 F.2d 1269, 1269-70 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam); North Miss. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096, 1101-03 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986).
10. 750 S.W.2d at 759-60.
11. See Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564-65 (5th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1105, 99 L. Ed.2d 267 (1988).
12. 755 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
13. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
14. 755 S.W.2d at 220 (emphasis added).




A recent decision of the Dallas Court of Appeals, Qwest Microwave, Inc. v.
Bedard,17 addressed the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court to entertain
a shareholder derivative suit brought by representatives of a pending estate.
After administrators of an estate holding shares in two corporations asserted
shareholder derivative claims in the statutory probate court, opponents of
the claims sought dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After
their effort proved unsuccessful before the probate court, the opponents
sought appellate review of the matter by way of a mandamus proceeding.
Section 5(d) of the Texas Probate Code18 authorizes a statutory probate
court to hear all matters incident to estates. Further, according to section
5A(b), all claims by estates fall within this grant, 19 provided settlement, par-
ticipation, or distribution of an estate is the controlling issue.20 The appel-
late court observed that amended section 5A(b), empowering the statutory
probate court to act in all "actions by or against a personal representa-
tive, ' '2 1 clarified the jurisdiction of the probate courts to decide unliquidated
claims. 22 The appellate court emphasized that the claimant must assert such
claims in his representative capacity. 23 Explaining that the representative
asserted the shareholder derivative claims on behalf of the corporations to
which the claims belonged, 24 the court concluded that the administrators
were acting in their capacity as shareholders and, as such, were merely nom-
inal plaintiffs. 25 The court therefore concluded that the probate court had
exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction and granted the request for a writ of
mandamus. 26
The trial practitioner should note one final case in the area of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Marketing, Inc. ,27 fol-
lowing the lead of an earlier Texas case, 28 held that state courts do not have
16. 755 S.W.2d at 219 ("it is readily apparent that the purpose of the bill was to overrule
Seay v. Hall"); but see Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630, 634 n.1 (Tex. 1986)
(opinion later withdrawn by agreement of parties district court still a proper forum for survival
actions under this amendment).
17. 756 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
18. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
19. Id. § 5A(b).
20. See Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1984). See generally Figari, Graves &
Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 491-92 (1986)
[hereinafter 1986 Annual Survey].
21. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
22. 756 S.W.2d at 436.




27. 744 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
28. Main Rusk Ass'n v. Interior Space Constr., 699 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ); accord Cacioppe v. Superior Holsteins III, Ltd., 650 F. Supp.
607, 608 nn.l-2 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Spence v. Flynt, 647 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Wyo. 1986);
Broadway Shoes v. San Antonio Shoe, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 584, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Massey v.
City of Oklahoma City, 643 F. Supp. 81, 84 (W.D. Okla. 1986); Kinsey v. Nestor Explor. Ltd.,
604 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-71 (D.C. Wash. 1985); Greenview Trading Co. v. Hershman &
Leicher, P.C., 108 A.D.2d 468, 489 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504-6 (1985). Contra County of Cook v.
Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1985); Contemporary Servs. v. Universal City
19891
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subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,29 generally known as "RICO." '30
The court noted that other jurisdictions have found concurrent state and
federal RICO jurisdiction.31 The opinion, however, simply found the Texas
cases more persuasive without further explanation.3 2
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The judiciary continues to measure the reach of the Texas long-arm stat-
ute.33 A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc. ,34 reiterated that when effect-
ing service under such statute, due process requirements may be satisfied
either "generally" 3' or "specifically." '36 A jilted prospective purchaser of
stock filed suit in Texas against the seller of the stock and the ultimate pur-
chaser, claiming breach of contract and tortious interference with contract.
The plaintiff effected service on the defendant purchaser, a Virginia company
that had virtually no direct contacts with Texas, under the long-arm statute.
The plaintiff, a Georgia corporation having its principal office in Texas, ne-
gotiated the alleged contract for the sale of stock with the defendant seller, a
nonresident of Texas, in either Georgia or New York. Furthermore, no evi-
dence demonstrated that the parties were to perform the contract in Texas
or that Texas law governed the contract. Likewise, the company whose
stock the plaintiff wished to purchase was not a Texas corporation and the
stock certificates were not located in Texas. Rejecting the plaintiff's specific
jurisdiction argument, the court observed that no evidence showed that the
defendant purchaser "aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas, or that
Texas is even the focal point of [the defendant purchaser's] tortious
conduct."'37
Given the virtual absence of any contact between the defendant purchaser
Studios, 655 F. Supp. 885, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Carman v. First Nat'l Bank, 642 F. Supp.
862, 864 (W.D. Ky. 1986); HMK Corp. v. Walsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D. Va. 1986);
Chas. Kurz Co. v. Lombardi, 595 F. Supp. 373, 381 n.l (E.D. Pa. 1984); Luebke v. Marine
Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d
903, 907-97, 710 P.2d 376, 376-82, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 575-82 (1985).
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
30. See 744 S.W.2d at 180.
31. Greenstein, 744 S.W.2d at 180 (citing Contemporary Servs. v. Universal City Studios,
655 F. Supp. 885, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1987); H.M.K. Corp. v. Nalsey, 637 F. Supp. 710, 717 (E.D.
Va. 1986); Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460, 1462 (E.D. Wisc. 1983)).
32. See supra note 31.
33. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989)
(formerly TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964) (repealed 1985)).
34. 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988).
35. " 'General jurisdiction' is personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's contacts with
the forum that are unrelated to the controversy. To exercise general jurisdiction, the court
must determine whether 'the contacts are sufficiently systematic and continuous as to support
a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction.' " Id. at 772 (citation omitted).36. " 'Specific jurisdiction' . . . is personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum
that are related to the particular controversy. [Citation omitted.] Even a single purposeful
contact may in a proper case be sufficient to meet the requirement of minimum contacts when
the cause of action arises from the contact." Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 773.
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and the forum, the plaintiff argued that the court should sustain general
jurisdiction by imputing to defendant the Texas activities of its subsidiaries.
The record showed that the subsidiaries kept separate books and accounts;
filed tax returns separate from the one filed by the defendant; separate
boards With overlapping, but not identical memberships managed the subsid-
iaries; persons other than the officers of the defendant ran the subsidiaries;
and the defendant did not direct the subsidiaries' day-to-day business. Ob-
serving that "where, as here, a wholly owned subsidiary is operated as a
distinct corporation, its contacts with the forum cannot be imputed to the
parent,"'38 the court concluded that general jurisdiction did not exist. 39
A relatively obscure provision of the long-arm statute drew the attention
of two courts during the Survey period.4° The construed portion of the stat-
ute stipulated that when the secretary of state receives process for forward-
ing to a nonresident defendant, "the secretary of state shall require a
statement of the [1] name and [2] address of the home or home office of the
nonresident" to facilitate such forwarding.4 1 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the name requirement in American Steel Building Co. v.
Davidson & Richardson Construction Co. 42 The plaintiff had previously sued
a nonresident defendant for breach of contract in Texas, effected service
under the long-arm statute, and secured a default judgment there that it
sought to enforce in Georgia. The appeal, which arose out of the enforce-
ment proceeding, focused on the forwarding of process by the secretary of
state to "Zed Davidson," rather than to "Fred Davidson," the named de-
fendant. 43 Finding a lack of strict compliance with the name requirement,
the court found the error fatal to the Texas court's exercise of personal juris-
diction and set aside the default judgment."
38. Id. at 773-74; see Smith v. Dainicki Kinzoku Kogyo Co., 680 F. Supp. 847, 854-55
(W.D. Tex. 1988).
39. 851 F.2d at 774.
40. At the time of the decisions discussed hereinafter, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2031b (Vernon 1964), amended by Act of May 17, 1979, ch. 245, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws
522, 522-23, repealed and recodified as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.043-.045
(Vernon 1986) was in effect.
41. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 5 (Vernon 1964), repealed and recodified as
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon 1986). The relevant portion of sec-
tion 5 is recodified in section 17.045(a). In all respects material to the referenced cases, the
statutes are indistinguishable. See Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind,
841 F.2d 646, 647 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988). It should be noted that service under the Texas long-
arm statute is not completed until process is forwarded by the secretary of state to the nonresi-
dent defendant and, in order to establish jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant's
person, the record must affirmatively show that the process was forwarded. Whitney v. L&L
Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973). See also Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 248 (1974).
42. 847 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision).
43. Id. at 1522.
44. American Steel is noteworthy in the area of personal jurisdiction for a further reason.
As an alternative ground of attack on the default judgment, the defendant asserted that he
never received process from the secretary of state and that one "Thomas Burrise," who signed
the receipt as his purported "agent," was not in fact his representative. See 847 F.2d at 1522.
Finding that this "latter objection has no basis under Texas law," the court emphasized that
"Texas does not require that a defendant actually receive the material, but only that it is served
1989]
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In Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind 45 the Fifth
Circuit focused on the current address requirement. In this instance, the
plaintiff supplied two inadequate addresses. The first address resulted in
process being returned to the secretary of state with the notation "Un-
claimed"; the second process, with a forwarding address, was again re-
turned, this time with the notation "Moved, Left No Address." 46 The
undisputed record before the court established that the addresses were out of
date and that the defendant did not receive actual notice of the suit until
after the trial court had entered a default judgment based on such service.
The defendant sought to have the default judgment set aside, arguing a lack
of compliance with the address requirement. Concluding that the defend-
ant's "last known" address did not fulfill the statutory intent that the ad-
dress be "current," the court set aside the default judgment.47
Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr,48 a recent decision of the Texas
Supreme Court, endorses the rule 10849 procedure for effectuating service in
Texas on a nonresident defendant. 50 This holding fulfills an earlier predic-
tion,51 and rejects a contrary holding of the Fifth Circuit. 52 Overruling the
appellant's contention that rule 108 "impermissibly abridges substantive
rights," the court held that "Rule 108 is a valid procedural alternative to
service under the long-arm statute. ''53
Imaginative plaintiffs might allege a conspiracy between a nonresident and
and mailed according to the statutory requirements." Id. See BLS Limousine Serv., Inc. v.
Buslease, Inc., 680 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. 841 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1988).
46. Id. at 648.
47. Id. at 650; see Southern Distrib. Co. v. Technical Support Ass'n, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 1, 2
(S.D. Tex. 1984); Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, no writ).
48. 749 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1988).
49. TEX. R. CIV. P. 108. Rule 108 authorizes service on a nonresident or absent defend-
ant "to the fullest extent that he may be required to appear and answer under the Constitution
of the United States in an action either in rem or in personam."
50. 749 S.W.2d at 495-96.
51. See Figari, Graves & Dwyer, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37
Sw. L.J. 1, 291-92 (1983).
52. Placid Inv., Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated
on rehearing on other grounds, 689 F.2d 1218 (1982); see Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 285
n.18 (5th Cir. 1982). But see U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.1
(Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (the purpose of the amendment to rule 108 is to
secure in personam jurisdiction to constitutional limits); Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 409
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (rule 108 can be viewed as a long-arm statute to obtain
personal jurisdiction); Grantham v. Aetna Life & Cas., 455 F. Supp. 440, 441 n. I (N.D. Tex.
1978) (amended rule 108 allows for obtaining personal jurisdiction); see also IA W. DOR-
SANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 32.50[2], at 32-18 (1981) (use of rule 108 when it cannot
be shown that statutory method provided actual notice of suit to nonresident); Figari, Graves
& Gordon, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 1, 436 (1982) (rule
108 offers full constitutional reach in effecting service upon nonresident); Sampson, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction Marries the Texas Family Code, 38 TEX. B.J. 1023, 1033 n.20 (1975) (rule 108 can
be construed as procedural enabling provision ratifying existing long-arm statutes); Weintraub,
Hall v. Helicopteros: The Texas Long-Arm's Grasp Exceeds Its Reach, 2 TEX. B. LITIGATION
SEC. REP. 1, 4-5 (1983). For additional discussion of rule 108, see Letter from Hans W. Baade
to the Texas Bar Journal (Dec. 1975), reprinted in 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975) (rule 108 as an
impermissible extension of the Texas long-arm statute).
53. 749 S.W.2d at 495.
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resident to extend the reach of the long-arm statute by imputing the Texas
activities of the resident to the nonresident. The first appellate decision in
Texas to face the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, McFee v. Chev-
ron International Oil Co.,54 arose during the Survey period. The court of
appeals, relying on federal authority,55 articulated several standards. The
McFee court emphasized that mere allegations of a conspiracy and the pres-
ence of one alleged co-conspirator within the forum will not sustain personal
jurisdiction over all the alleged co-conspirators. 56 The court insisted that
the plaintiff carry a heavy burden of showing foreseeability by the nonresi-
dent co-conspirator. 57 The plaintiff would "meet due process requirements
by showing a conspiracy and connecting the acts of the resident conspirator.
Due process requires that the nonresident defendant either must have
known, or should have known of the effects of his act.58 In McFee the plain-
tiffs failed to make the necessary showing and the appellate court affirmed
the dismissal of the nonresident defendant. 59
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The decisions of Allied Bank v. Pleasant Homes, Inc.6° and Bronze &
Beautiful Inc. v. Mahone61 stand as a warning to plaintiff's attorneys that in
order to support a default judgment, the pleadings must adequately allege
the service agent's authority. In Allied Bank the plaintiff alleged in its peti-
tion that the defendant was a "banking association" and service could be
obtained on "any vice-president or the cashier."' 62 Subsequently, the plain-
tiff filed a return, which recited that service was executed by delivering pro-
cess to the defendant's "agent of service, Beverly Walters, V.P."'63 The
defendant failed to appear or answer, and the plaintiff secured a default judg-
ment for $795,000. After the default judgment became final the defendant
attacked it by writ of error. Noting that the petition did not affirmatively
allege the capacity or authority of Beverly Walters, the court of appeals con-
cluded that nothing in the record supported her agency for service and set
54. 753 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
55. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256, 1260-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
56. See 753 S.W.2d at 473. See, e.g., Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1980);
Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D. Colo. 1983); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1376
(2d Cir. 1972).
57. 753 S.W.2d at 473.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 757 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
61. 750 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ).
62. Allied Bank, 757 S.W.2d at 462. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-915 (Vernon
Supp. 1989), which specifies the manner in which a state bank may be served, states that:
"The president, a vice-president, or a cashier of a state or private bank is an agent of the bank
on whom process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served on the bank
may be served."
63. 757 S.W.2d at 463.
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aside the default judgment.64
Similarly, in Mahone the plaintiff requested service by certified mail on
"Bronze & Beautiful, Inc., Carol Jeannine Duty, Its Registered Agent" at a
specified address. Eunice Harvey signed the return receipt as "Signature-
Addressee" and the initials "M.W." appeared above the line for "Signature-
Agent." On the basis of this service the plaintiff obtained a default judg-
ment. At a hearing for the defendant's motion for new trial, the plaintiff
apparently realized the inadequacy of the record and attempted to develop
testimony in the record that showed Eunice Harvey was authorized to ac-
cept service. 65 Setting aside the default judgment, the court held that when
serving an agent for a corporation the record must show that the individual
served is in fact the agent for service and that testimony at a new trial hear-
ing is ineffective to revive the invalid judgment.66
General Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Higginbotham 67 indicates that
the time of service may be important. Former article 3.64 of the Texas In-
surance Code, 68 which applied at the time in question, authorized service on
a domestic insurance company "by leaving a copy of same at the home office
of such company during business hours."'69 The plaintiff effected service on
the two defendants, both of whom were domestic insurance companies, by
leaving process at their home offices on a specified date "at 12:01 o'clock
P.M." On the basis of this service, the court entered a default judgment
against the defendants. The defendants subsequently sought to set the de-
fault aside by writ of error. Concluding that nothing in the record indicated
that the specified time of service was during defendants' "business hours,"
the court found a lack of compliance with the applicable statute and set aside
the default judgment. 70
The rule has long obtained that when a return of citation is regular on its
face and recites that the defendant has been served in person, a presumption
of proper service arises and can only be rebutted by corroborated proof.71
Huffeldt v. Competition Drywall, Inc. 72 is instructive as to the evidentiary
showing that must be made in order to satisfy this rule. After suffering a
default judgment on the basis of a return that recited personal service on a
64. Id. at 463; see American Univ. Ins. Co. v. D.B. & B., Inc., 725 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Encore Builders v. Wells, 636 S.W.2d 722, 722-
23 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); Pharmakinetics Laboratories, Inc. v. Katz, 717
S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ). See generally Keltner & Burke,
Protecting the Record for Appeal: A Reference Guide in Texas Civil Cases, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J.
273, 302-03 (1983) (discussing record requirements for default judgment).
65. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d at 29.
66. Id. See generally Keltner & Burke, supra note 60, at 302-03 (discussing record re-
quirements for default judgment).
67. 750 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
68. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.64 (Vernon 1981), repealed by Act of April 30, 1987, ch.
46, § 12, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 159, 179.
69. Id.
70. 750 S.W.2d at 21.
71. See Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972); Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593,
227 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1950).
72. 750 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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specified data, the defendant filed a motion for new trial supported by affida-
vits. The affidavits, one by the defendant and one by his secretary, attested
to the defendant's absence from the city on the recited date of personal ser-
vice. The defendant attached a copy of his airline tickets and motel bill,
further supporting his absence from the city on the date in question.
Although the trial court overruled the motion for new trial, the defendant
perfected an appeal and the appellate court found that defendant had satis-
fied the rule with direct and objective proof.73
IV. PLEADINGS
Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure imposes an obligation on
litigants to specifically plead affirmative defenses and identifies a number of
defenses that are within its scope. 74 Davis v. City of San Antonio,75 a case of
interest to municipal trial counsel, emphasizes that the list of defenses in rule
94 is not exclusive. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant municipal-
ity, but the municipality never plead the defense of governmental immunity.
After an adverse jury verdict, the municipality attempted to raise the defense
by way of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, though
successful in the lower courts, the supreme court reversed. 76 Finding that
rule 94 includes governmental immunity, the supreme court concluded that
the defendant waived the defense by not asserting it prior to trial.
77
Rule 63 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that parties "may
amend their pleadings" by filing them with the clerk; provided that "any
amendment offered for filing within seven days of the date of trial or thereaf-
ter.., shall be filed only after leave.., is obtained."78 Divergent views as to
the intended scope of "amendment" under rule 63 appear to be taking shape.
Does rule 63 apply to all pleadings after the first in a series? Does it also
apply to original pleadings provided they are tendered for filing after a time
limit authorized by the rule? Brown Lex Real Estate Development Corp. v.
American National Bank-South, 79 taking a liberal approach to interpreta-
tion, concluded that an original counterclaim by a defendant was "supple-
mental" to the record.80 Defendant must file the counterclaim within the
73. Id. at 273.
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. Rule 94 provides, in part, that:
[A] party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow ser-
vant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of fraud, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
75. 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1988).
76. Id. at 520.
77. Id. at 519-20.
78. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
79. 736 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
80. Id. at 206; accord Hawkins v. Anderson, 672 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, no writ); Claude Regis Vargo Enter. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. App.-
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time allowed by the rule.81 To the contrary, Lee v. Key West Towers, Inc.,2
a decision of the supreme court, suggested a more restrictive view. In con-
struing rule 63 the court held that the rule did not to apply to "original or
supplemental pleadings."' 83 A pleading that was the first answer to a cross-
claim, which did not supersede or displace any prior pleading, was not an
amended pleading under the rule.84 Since the supreme court has granted
rehearing in the case, 85 such action may suggest a reconsideration of its
position.
The harried trial practitioner, rushing to file a petition may take some
comfort from Baker v. Charles.86 The plaintiff filed suit against "Holly
Baker" and, after service of process, obtained a default judgment against the
defendant under that name. On appeal, the intended defendant, "Holley
Farlane Baker II," sought to overturn the judgment, claiming that he was an
indispensable party and that the trial court never obtained personal jurisdic-
tion over him. 87 Noting that the defendant failed to raise any issues of mis-
take in identity or lack of service, the court of appeals upheld the judgment,
stating that "[w]hen an intended defendant is sued under an incorrect name,
jurisdiction is proper after service on the defendant under the misnomer, if it
is clear no one was misled."88
In Bethel v. Norman Furniture Co. 89 the defendant contended that the
pleadings and the evidence did not support an award of attorneys' fees. 90
The court of appeals held that a petition that seeks recovery of attorneys'
fees in at least a specified sum authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees on
appeal in the absence of a special exception. 91 The court, therefore, rejected
defendant's claim since pursuant to rules 90 and 91, defendant failed to file
special exceptions to the pleading. 92
V. VENUE
A defendant clearly waives his objection to improper venue unless he files
a written motion to transfer venue prior to or concurrently with any other
plea, pleading or motion except a special appearance. 93 The court in Grozier
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Box v. Ass'n Inv. Co., 389 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ).
81. 736 S.W.2d at 206.
82. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 127 (Dec. 9, 1987) (per curiam), rehearing granted, 31 Tex. Sup.
Ct. J. 238 (Feb. 24, 1988).
83. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 127.
84. Id.
85. See 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 238 (Feb. 24, 1988).
86. 746 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 855; accord Orange Grove Indep. School Dist. v. Rivera, 679 S.W.2d 482, 483
(Tex. 1984); Cockrell v. Estevez, 737 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no
writ).
89. 756 S.W.2d 6, 8-9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
90. Id. at 8.
91. Id. at 8-9.
92. Id. at 8.
93. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86(1).
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v. L-B Sprinkler & Plumbing Repair94 illustrates another manner by which a
party may waive venue. A defendant also waives his venue rights, even if he
timely files the required motion and requests a hearing, unless he thereafter
pursues the hearing and obtains a ruling on his motion.
Rule 87 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the prompt deter-
mination of a motion to transfer venue and imposes a duty on the movant to
request a hearing on the motion.95 Although the defendant in Grozier com-
plied with the rule's requirements by promptly scheduling a hearing on his
motion to transfer venue, he failed to press his motion at the time of the
hearing. On that date, instead, the court considered only a later filed motion
by defendant's counsel to withdraw. Once the court granted that motion,
defendant failed to urge his venue motion or reschedule it for hearing. Sev-
eral months later the court granted a summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,
whereupon the defendant filed a motion for new trial complaining of the
court's failure to grant his motion to transfer venue.
The court of appeals held that the defendant's failure to reset his motion
after the original hearing where the court had failed to consider the motion
constituted a waiver of his venue rights.96 The court also found evidence of
an implied waiver in the defendant's affirmative actions seeking the with-
drawal of his attorney and the filing a motion for new trial.97 In an attempt
to excuse these actions, the defendant argued that no venue hearing was
required because the plaintiff failed to answer or otherwise controvert the
motion to transfer venue. While the court of appeals acknowledged that a
court should grant an uncontested motion to change venue if sufficient evi-
dence supports the motion,98 the court of appeals nevertheless concluded
that the trial court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits because the
defendant failed to obtain a ruling on his motion. 99 In so holding, the court
distinguished those cases decided before the 1983 venue amendments, which
had held that the filing of a plea of privilege divested the trial court of juris-
diction, pending disposal of the plea, to enter judgment on the merits against
the defendant. 00
Tenneco, Inc. v. Salyer 101 warns plaintiffs who do not wisely exercise their
venue choice that the court may not allow second chances. Plaintiff brought
suit in Matagorda County against Tenneco, which promptly moved to trans-
94. 744 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
95. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(1).
96. 744 S.W.2d at 311.
97. Id. While the court's ultimate decision in the case cannot be seriously questioned,
these latter two bases for its holding seem dubious. In his motion for new trial, the defendant
complained only about the trial court's failure to grant his venue motion. While that motion
was probably ill-advised, since TEX. R. Civ. P. 87(5) permits only one venue determination,
which is to be made at the outset of the suit, it hardly constitutes an intentional relinquishment
of a known right-the standard typically associated with acts of waiver.
98. Id. at 308-09.
99. Id. at 312.
100. Id. at 309 (discussing Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 397, 48 S.W.2d
978, 981 (1932); Rosenthal v. Short, 582 S.W.2d 214, 215 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd).
101. 739 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
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fer venue to Harris County. Apparently unsure of his original venue choice,
the plaintiff then filed a motion asking the court to transfer venue to Whar-
ton County. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and ordered the case
transferred to Wharton County. Tenneco sought a writ of mandamus di-
recting the Wharton county clerk to return the original suit papers to Mata-
gorda and ordering the trial court to transfer venue to Harris County.
The court of appeals agreed with Tenneco that the trial court acted im-
properly since neither the venue statute nor the amended rules permit a
plaintiff to file a motion to transfer venue if he has improvidently brought
suit in an improper county. 0 2 According to the court, only a defendant can
plead under rule 86,103 which discusses the requisites of a motion to transfer
venue. 10 4 Consequently, the applicable portion of the venue statute10 5 that
allows the trial court to transfer an action to another county of proper venue
does not permit a plaintiff to correct an improper choice of suit by motion to
transfer. 106
In spite of its agreement with the defendant's position regarding venue,
the court in Tenneco denied the requested mandamus. 10 7 The court ob-
served that section 15.064(b)' 0 8 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code
(venue statute) preserves defendant's right to appeal the trial court's im-
proper venue ruling. Reversal in this situation is automatic. Based on this
statutory interpretation the court concluded that an adequate remedy other
than mandamus was available to the defendants.10 9 The court dispelled de-
fendant's fear that its appellate remedy would be inadequate if Wharton
County also turned out to be a proper county for venue purposes by observ-
ing that the venue statute I° required the court, on appeal, to look at the
entire record in reviewing the venue determination, including how the case
was transferred to Wharton County."'I Thus, even if venue were proper in
Wharton County, the court intimated that reversible error would exist since
transfer of the suit should not have occurred under the circumstances.
The latter result was not quite as obvious to the court in Cox Engineering,
Inc. v. Funston Machine & Supply Co. 112 Indeed, the court expressly noted
that a court had yet to decide whether transfer of a case from one county
where venue properly lies to another county where venue is also proper
amounted to reversible error. 113 In Cox, however, the court never reached
102. Id. at 449.
103. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
104. 739 S.W.2d at 449.
105. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.063 (Vernon 1986).
106. 739 S.W.2d at 449.
107. Id. at 450.
108. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
109. 739 S.W.2d at 450. But see Dorchester Master Ltd. v. Anthony, 734 S.W.2d 151, 152
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ) (permitting mandamus remedy where venue
order is void). See also 1988 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 534-35 (discussing Dorchester
Master Ltd.).
110. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
111. 739 S.W.2d at 450.
112. 749 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
113. Id. at 511.
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that question. Instead, the court held that transfer was proper since plaintiff
had failed to make prima facie proof of the venue facts on which it relied by
filing an affidavit setting forth those venue facts. 1 4 Appellant sought to
overcome this defect in the record by pointing to depositions and other dis-
covery on file at the time of the venue determination. Appellant contended
that the appellate court should reverse the trial court's judgement if this
discovery proved the venue facts it originally alleged. Appellant based his
argument on the venue statute, which mandates consideration of the entire
record on appeal from a venue determination.' 15 The court of appeals dis-
agreed, holding that the standard of review set forth in section 15.064(b) of
the venue statute only applied in evaluating the propriety of venue in the
transferee forum.16 In deciding whether proper venue existed in the origi-
nal forum, on the other hand, the court held that its review was confined to
the record as it existed in the trial court when the trial court determined
venue. 1 7 According to the court, the trial judge could properly consider
only the pleadings and affidavits in making its venue determination." 18 Since
plaintiff failed to file any affidavit incorporating or attaching the depositions
or other discovery on file in support of its venue position, the court refused
to consider that evidence." 19
VI. LIMITATIONS
The discovery rule, which courts have extended over the past decade to
cover a variety of types of actions,' 20 provides that the statute of limitations
will not start running until the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving rise to
his claimed damage or until the date the plaintiff should have reasonably
disconcerned the facts that establish the cause of action. 12 Since its judicial
114. Id.
115. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986).
116. 749 S.W.2d at 511.
117. Id. at 512. According to the court, it was not required to apply the same "harsh
standard" of appeal in determining whether it was error to transfer the case from a county
where venue may also have been proper. Id. Unfortunately, the court failed to cite any au-
thority or rationale for this questionable conclusion involving one of the most troubling provi-
sions of the amended venue statue.
118. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 87).
119. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 88).
120. See, e.g., Thrift v. Tenneco Chems, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (breach of
warranty by drug manufacturer); Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976); Gaddis v.
Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (foreign object left in body by surgeon); Atkins v. Cross-
land, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (negligent preparation of tax return by accountant); Jim
Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo, 616 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no
writ) (deceptive trade practices claim); see also Note, Kelley v. Rinkle: Texas Embraces the
Discovery Rule in Credit Libel, 30 Sw. L.J. 950 (1976) (submission of false credit report by
creditor); Note, Limitations of Actions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1967).
121. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (statute of limitations begins
to run from time of discovery of true facts or from date it should, using ordinary care and
diligence, have been discovered); Anderson v. Sneed, 615 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1981, no writ). See generally Figari, Graves & Gordon, supra note 52, at 450.
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inception in 1967,122 the rule has operated most frequently in suits against
doctors for medical malpractice arising from negligently administrated treat-
ment. 123 Until this past year, however, the supreme court had never decided
whether the rule applies in actions for legal malpractice. 124 Lower courts
addressing the question had reached divergent results, with the majority re-
fusing to extend the rule's application to such suits.' 25
The supreme court's decision in Willis v. Maverick 126 finally resolves the
issue. The supreme court brought Texas in line with the ever increasing
number of states that have adopted the discovery rule in instances of legal
malpractice. 127 In Willis the court held that the statute of limitations for
legal malpractice actions does not begin to run until the claimant discovers
or should have discovered through the exercise of reasonable care and dili-
gence the facts establishing his cause of action. 128 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court observed that the policy reasons justifying imposition of the
rule in other contexts were no less compelling in circumstances of legal mal-
practice. 129 The court found further justification for its holding in the spe-
cial relationship that exists between an attorney and client.'
30
The decision in Willis also ends any lingering debate about which statute
of limitations is applicable to claims of legal malpractice. Declaring that a
cause of action for legal malpractice is in the nature of a tort, the court held
that the two-year limitations statute' 3' applies.' 32 A court of appeals
reached the same decision in Sledge v. Alsup.133 There the court refused to
permit a plaintiff to fracture his cause of action for malpractice into claims
for negligence, fraud, or breach of contract in an effort to avoid the two-year
limitations bar. 134
122. The supreme court first pronounced the rule in Texas in Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1967).
123. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (failure of vasectomy operation);
Newberry v. Tarvin, 594 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (negli-
gent insertion of an I.U.D.); Fitzpatrick v. Marlow, 553 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (negligent nose surgery). But cf Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18
(Tex. 1977) (5-4 decision) (discovery rule is inapplicable to action for negligent diagnosis).
124. See Smith v. Knight, 608 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1980).
125. Compare McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (discovery rule does not apply, but when duty arising out of attorney-client rela-
tionship to disclose facts material to representation is breached, statute is tolled for so long as
attorney-client relationship exists) and Pack v. Taylor, 584 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discovery rule does not apply) with Smith v. Knight, 598
S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1980) (discovery rule applies).
126. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 569 (July 9, 1988).
127. The court noted in its opinion that twenty-four other states have judicially adopted
the discovery rule in legal malpractice cases, and several other states have imposed the rule by
legislative enactment or adopted variations of the discovery rule. Id. at 572.
128. Id. at 571-72.
129. Id. at 571.
130. Id.
131. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
132. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 572.
133. 759 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).




Citizens State Bank v. Caney Investments135 concerned a bizarre set of
procedural events that culminated in an intervention of parties one year after
entry of a final judgment. In a proceeding ancillary to a divorce judgment,
the trial court appointed a receiver to take possession of certain assets and
sell them. A company wholly owned by the husband and the wife held one
of the assets, a tract of realty, in the company's name. The company, how-
ever, served as the general partner of a limited partnership that actually
owned the realty. Approximately one year after the divorce judgment had
become final, a bank, which had received an allegedly unauthorized deed of
trust on the realty from the company to secure the husband's personal debts,
attempted to foreclose under the instrument. Fearing a loss of their interests
in the realty, the limited partners of the partnership intervened in the ancil-
lary proceeding and obtained a permanent injunction against the bank's ef-
forts. On review the supreme court found that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to allow the intervention and vacated the injunction. 136
A case of first impression in Texas concerning shareholder derivative ac-
tions and proper parties is Eye Site, Inc. v. Blackburn.'37 Eye Site involved
an action by a minority shareholder who sought to bring a shareholder de-
rivative suit. The court of appeals held that when the remaining sharehold-
ers have denied that the plaintiff; the minority shareholder, represents their
interests or that the remaining shareholders are named defendants, a single
shareholder cannot maintain a derivative action.1 38
VIII. DISCOVERY
A. Discovery Procedures
Two cases during the Survey period addressed issues related to the time
and place for depositions. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Street 139 the plaintiff
sought to take the deposition of Sam Walton, chairman of the board of de-
fendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in Fort Worth, Texas where the case was
pending. In this regard, the plaintiff directed the notice of deposition to
Walton as an employee or agent of the company. Relying on the provisions
of rule 201,140 the supreme court held that the trial judge abused his discre-
tion by ordering the deposition to be taken in Fort Worth. 14' The high court
noted 142 that, under rule 201, if a party directs a deposition notice to the
corporation and the corporation designates an agent to give the deposition,
the deposition may be taken in the country of suit, subject to the protective
135. 746 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1988).
136. Id. at 478.
137. 750 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
138. Id. at 276; accord Rathborne v. Rathborne, 508 F. Supp. 515, 518-19 (E.D. La. 1980),
aff'd on other grounds, 683 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1982); Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., 420 F.
Supp. 226, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
139. 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 630 (July 13, 1988).
140. TEX. R. Civ. P. 201.




provisions of rule 166b(4).' 43 In this case, however, Walmart did not desig-
nate Walton to testify on its behalf at the deposition. Accordingly, the pro-
vision of rule 201(5), 144 which generally specifies that a party must take a
deposition of a nonparty in the county of the witness' residence, his place of
business or employment, or such other convenient place, applied to Walton,
as a non-party. Since the record did not indicate that it was convenient for
Walton, a resident of Arkansas, to travel to Fort Worth, the supreme court
found that the trial court's order conflicted with the provisions of rule 201.
Several weeks prior to trial, the defendant in Bohmfalk v. Linwood 145 took
the deposition of a witness on only four days notice. Although recognizing
that the notice was "somewhat scant," the appellate court determined that it
was not unreasonable per se. 146 Further, the court ruled that the plaintiff
waived any objection to the use of the deposition at trial by failing to apply
for a protective order prior to the taking of the deposition and by failing to
show it was not feasible to do so. 14
7
For the practitioner who drafts preliminary statements in introductions to
written discovery responses, Morehead v. Morehead 148 serves as a warning
that such statements may not be usable at trial. In Morehead, one of the
parties sought to read at trial a preliminary statement made by another party
in responding to requests for admissions. Noting that the trial court dis-
missed the responding party that had made the statement, the supreme court
held that the preliminary statement was hearsay. 149 The statement, there-
fore, was inadmissible even if the responses to the requests were admitted. 150
B. Privileges and Exemptions
In Mutter v. Wood,15 1 a medical malpractice action, the trial judge or-
dered the plaintiff to sign an authorization permitting the defendant-hospi-
tal's attorney to discuss the medical care and treatment of their deceased son
with all treating physicians and health care providers. The supreme court
construed the authorization as a complete waiver of plaintiffs' physician-pa-
tient privilege under rule 509152 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 153 and held
that such authorization was overly broad.' 54 The trial judge should have
drawn the authorization more restrictively in order to preserve the privilege
for communications and records that "might exist after suit was filed."' 55
143. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
144. Id. 201(5).
145. 742 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
146. Id. at 520.
147. Id.
148. 741 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. 1987).
149. Id. at 382.
150. Id.
151. 744 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. 1988).
152. TEX. R. EvID. 509.





Under rule 166b' 56 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a consulting
expert's identity, mental impressions and opinions are generally protected
from discovery, subject to certain limited exceptions. In Tom L. Scott, Inc.
v. Mcllhany,157 a party designated a group of persons as testifying experts,
resulting in the scheduling of their depositions. On the morning of the pro-
posed depositions, the party redesignated the experts as consulting experts
and did not allow the depositions to proceed. In a mandamus proceeding to
overturn the trial court's denial of an order requiring the depositions to go
forward, the court of appeals held that the original designation of the experts
as witnesses did not waive the consulting expert privilege. 158 Further, the
appellate court ruled that a party is "under no duty to produce evidence by
an expert witness which may be adverse to his position." 159 Accordingly,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order the
depositions. 160
C. Procedure for Claiming Privilege or Exemption
In the past few years, an overwhelming number of cases have discussed
the procedures for claiming privilege in the discovery context, which the
landmark decision of Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial Dis-
trict 161 first outlined. Rule 166b 162 later incorporated these procedures.
The year 1988 proved to be no exception to this trend. In Hoffman v. Fifth
Court of Appeals 163 a party objected to production of its income tax returns
on grounds of relevancy and as an invasion of privacy. After a hearing on
the matter, but without an in camera inspection, the trial judge held that the
returns were discoverable. In a subsequent mandamus action, the supreme
court held that an in camera inspection was not required and thus held that
the trial judge had not committed error. 164 The supreme court noted that
under rule 166b(4), 165 a trial court need not conduct an in camera inspection
prior to ruling on a discovery objection if the basis for the objection is some-
thing other than a specific immunity, exemption, or privilege. 166 The rule
specifically states that an in camera examination is not required if the basis
of the objection is invasion of personal, constitutional, or property rights,
such as the objection made in Hoffman. 167
Pursuant to the Peeples holding, a party claiming privilege bears the bur-
156. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)(e).
157. 753 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ); accord Axelson, Inc. v.
Mcllhan, 755 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
158. 753 S.W.2d at 219.
159. Id. at 218.
160. Id.
161. 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
162. TEX. R. Cv. P. 166b(4).
163. 756 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1988).
164. Id.
165. TEX. R. Ov. P. 166b(4).
166. Hoffman, 756 S.W.2d at 723.
167. TEX. R. Ov. P. 166b(4).
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den of producing evidence to support his claim. 168 In Barnes v. Whitting-
ton 169 the defendant hospital sought to prevent discovery of its records on
grounds of privilege. ' 70 At a hearing on a motion to compel production, the
hospital delivered the documents in sealed envelopes to the trial court for in
camera inspection. In addition to the documents, the hospital included two
affidavits in sealed envelopes that it had not served on opposing counsel.
The supreme court ruled that this method of submitting the affidavits was
improper, and that the trial court should have refused to consider them. 17'
Thus, in order to comply with the Peeples procedures, a party must make all
evidence, such as affidavits, available to opposing counsel.
The court in Shell Western E & P, Inc. v. Oliver 172 considered the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit in support of a claim of attorney-client privilege. One
of the party's attorneys submitted the affidavit in question in which he
stated, among other things, that first, certain documents were written by a
lawyer to a client; and second that the documents consisted of communica-
tions from a client to its attorney concerning ongoing discussions with an-
other party about the construction or operation of a plant, which was
involved in the suit. 173 Notwithstanding an objection that the affidavit was
conclusory in nature, the appellate court found that the affidavit established
a prima facie case for the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.1 74
Finally, in Biernat v. Powell 1 75 the court addressed the procedures appli-
cable to claims of confidentiality for bank records under article 342-705. 176
Generally, a party seeking production of the records of a bank's customer
must give notice of the request to the customer at least 10 days prior to the
date that compliance with the request is required, and certify to the bank
that the customer has been served with the notice. 177 The customer then
may file a motion to quash or for a protective order.1 78 In this case the
relator gave the required notice, but the customer did not file a motion to
quash or for a protective order. Instead, the customer sent a letter to the
parties, requesting that his bank records remain private and stating that the
letter " 'serve[d] as proper notice that no records should be released without
[his] personal authorization.' "179 The court of appeals determined that the
letter did not comply with the statute and, hence, the customer had waived
any objection to the bank's production of his records. Further, the court
reached that result even though the bank, upon receipt of the letter, had filed
168. Peeples v. Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial District, 701 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.
1985).
169. 751 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1988)..
170. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
171. 751 S.W.2d at 495.
172. 751 S.W.2d 195 (Tei. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
173. Id. at 196.
174. Id.
175. 757 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
176. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-705 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
177. Id. § 2'.
178. Id. § 3.
179. Biernat, 757 S.W.2d at 116.
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a motion to determine its responsibility to produce the documents. 180
D. Duty to Supplement Discovery
As noted in a prior Survey, 18 1 the courts have strictly enforced the duty of
a party under rules 166b1 82 and 215 83 to supplement responses to discovery.
In general, a party must supplement discovery as soon as practicable, but in
no event less than 30 days prior to trial.1 84 A party who fails to comply with
that duty is subject to sanctions, including the exclusion of evidence belat-
edly designated unless good cause is shown.1 8 5 A number of cases discussed
the showing necessary to establish good cause.
In Hall Construction Co. v. Texas Industries, Inc. 186 the plaintiff failed to
timely identify two witnesses in response to interrogatories inquiring about
the identity of persons with knowledge of facts relevant to the case. On
appeal, plaintiff contended that it had shown good cause because defendants
had notice of the identity of the two persons, as one of them had actually
certified the plaintiff's company's answers to the interrogatories and the
other had signed an affidavit filed in the case. The court of appeals held,
however, that those grounds were not sufficient to constitute good cause.'
8 7
Similarly, in Braniff, Inc. v. Lentz 18 8 plaintiffs failed to identify the address
of a fact witness in response to an interrogatory. As grounds for good cause,
plaintiff argued that defendants were not surprised by the witness' testimony
because he testified that he had given daily reports to the defendant company
while working for one of its contractors and his name, if not address, was
timely disclosed in the answers to interrogatories. The appeals court ruled
that such matters did not demonstrate good cause.1 8 9 In an attempt to show
good cause, the plaintiff in Lohie Investment Co. v. C. G.P, Inc. 190 argued
that he had provided the substance of an undisclosed expert's testimony in
answers to interrogatories, if not his identity. The court of appeals rejected
that argument as a basis for good cause.1 9' The court further noted that the
failure of the opposing party to accept an offer to depose the expert 10 days
prior to trial was also not a sufficient ground to allow the expert's testi-
mony. 192 In Smith v. Christley19 3 one of the defendants had propounded
interrogatories to plaintiff regarding the identity of experts. That defendant
eventually entered into a settlement with plaintiff. At trial, the remaining
defendant, who had not served interrogatories, objected to the testimony of
180. Id. at 117.
181. See 1988 Annual Survey, supra note 2, at 545-46.




186. 748 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
187. Id. at 536.
188. 748 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
189. Id. at 300; accord Morrow v. H.E.B., 714 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1986).
190. 751 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
191. Id. at 315.
192. Id. at 316.
193. 755 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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an unidentified expert offered by plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the
remaining defendant was entitled to rely on the interrogatories and answers
of the other defendant and, therefore, the objection was proper. 194
City of San Antonio v. Fulcher 195 demonstrates that the sanctions for fail-
ing to supplement are not limited to exclusion of evidence. In this workers'
compensation case, plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of his income from
moonlighting employment in addition to his regular employment. At trial,
plaintiff produced for the first time his income tax returns to defendant who
had requested them during discovery. The returns reflected a lower amount
of income than plaintiff had testified that he had earned in his moonlighting
endeavors. The court of appeals decided that the sanctions for failing to
supplement discovery should apply equally to a party who fails to disclose
information that is unfavorable to his case as to one who fails to disclose
information useful to his opponent.19 6 Accordingly, the court held that
plaintiff should have been prohibited from testifying at all about any moon-
lighting income in excess of that reported in his non-disclosed returns. 197
Finally, the court in Gandara v. Novasad 198 held that the duty to supple-
ment answers to interrogatories is inapplicable to a summary judgment pro-
ceeding. Accordingly, the court ruled that it could consider the affidavits of
undisclosed experts in connection with a motion for summary judgment. 199
E. Sanctions
Two cases discussed procedures that parties must follow before a court
will impose discovery sanctions. In Palmer v. Cantrell20° the court held that
a hearing must be held before sanctions are imposed. In this regard, the
court found that a trial court's hearing on a motion for reconsideration of a
dismissal of a case, as sanctions, was insufficient. 20 1 In Zep Manufacturing
Co. v. Anthony 20 2 the court of appeals ruled that the trial court may not sua
sponte impose sanctions without a motion requesting sanctions. Further, the
court reached that conclusion in this case, even though the trial court had
imposed the sanctions at a hearing on motion to compel discovery. 203
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A number of cases during the Survey period discussed the sufficiency and
form of evidence that will support or defeat a motion for summary judg-
ment. In a personal injury action, the defendant in Randall v. Dallas Power
194. Id. at 530.
195. 749 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
196. Id. at 220.
197. Id.
198. 752 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
199. Id. at 742-43.
200. 747 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
201. Id.
202. 752 S.W.2d 687, 689, 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
203. Id. at 690.
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& Light Co. 204 moved for summary judgment on the basis of a release signed
by the plaintiff. In response, plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which he
claimed that defendant's agent had made fraudulent representations in ob-
taining the release. After the trial court denied the initial summary judg-
ment motion on the basis of the affidavit, defendant deposed plaintiff who, in
his deposition, stated that he did not remember the representations made by
defendant's agent. Thereafter, the trial court granted defendant's second
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the supreme court concluded
that the trial court had ignored the well-established rule that a "deposition
does not have controlling effect over an affidavit" 20 5 with respect to a sum-
mary judgment motion. Accordingly, the supreme court held that the trial
court should not have granted the motion in light of the conflict between the
affidavit and the deposition testimony. 20 6
Rule 166a 2° 7 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an affi-
davit submitted in connection with a summary judgment motion "shall be
made on personal knowledge" and "shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." In Radio Station
KSCS v. Jenning20 8 plaintiff brought an action against a radio station seek-
ing to collect $25,000 that the station promised to pay if it failed to play
"three songs in a row without commercial interruption." After the radio
station moved for summary judgment, plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that:
(i) the station received the records it played without charge from record
companies; (ii) in return, the station announced the name of the songs and
singers when it played the records; and (iii) thus, the announcement of the
names constituted a commercial interruption. The supreme court held,
however, the affidavit was deficient because it failed to demonstrate the basis
for plaintiff's personal knowledge of those matters. 2° 9 In this regard, the
court rejected plaintiff's argument that he had shown such a basis by stating
he had done "promotional work for [a] musician. '210
During the past few years, the trend of supreme court decisions in defama-
tion cases has been to reject attempts by defendants to obtain summary judg-
ment on the basis of affidavits that purport to negate the required intent
element of proof.21 1 The supreme court in Channel 4 KGBT v. Briggs212
distinguished its prior holdings and upheld a summary judgment in favor of
a defendant television station. In this libel action, defendant had published a
television report about the Ku Klux Klan in which an image of plaintiff, a
204. 752 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1988).
205. Id. at 5; accord Gaines v. Hammon, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 562 (1962).
206. Randall, 752 S.W.2d at 5.
207. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(e).
208. 750 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1988).
209. Id. at 762.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Bessent v. Times-Herald Printing Co., 709 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1986) (affidavit
not readily controverted); Beaumont Enter. & Journal v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1985)
(defendant's affidavit as to own state of mind not readily controverted as requested for sum-
mary judgment).
212. 759 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1988).
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political candidate, appeared for a brief period while the audio portion of the
report continued. The defendant station claimed that the broadcast of plain-
tiff's image was a technical mistake. In support of that claim, the affidavits
of defendant's news manager and reporter stated, among other things, that
they had no ill feelings toward plaintiff nor reason to injure him, they did not
know plaintiff's likeness would appear during the newscast, and the appear-
ance of plaintiff's likeness during the newscast was a "fluke" or accident. 2 13
Upholding a summary judgment in favor of defendant, the supreme court
distinguished the present case from other decisions reversing summary judg-
ments where defendants had submitted "self-serving statements about their
state of mind."' 2 14 According to the court, the affidavits in this case estab-
lished "an objective explanation" for the mistaken broadcast and, thus, sum-
mary judgment was proper. 21 5
As noted in the last Survey, 2 16 rule 206,217 as amended, provides that dep-
ositions are no longer filed with the court or clerk. Correspondingly, rule
166a, 2 1 1 which governs summary judgment practice, now allows a trial court
to consider deposition transcripts set forth or referenced in a motion for
summary judgment and in responses to such motion. The court of appeals
in Deerland Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co. 2 19 had the opportu-
nity to discuss the effect of those amendments. In this case, the parties had
taken depositions and tendered them to the clerk of the court for filing. Re-
lying on rule 206, the clerk refused to allow the filing of the depositions and
instead filed only the court reporter's certificate. On appeal from a summary
judgment ruling, the court of appeals ruled that the deposition testimony
was not properly offered or authenticated and, hence, could not be
considered.
In this regard, the court opined as to the proper methods of offering depo-
sitions in the summary judgment context under the amended rules. One
method, according to the court, is for the attorney, who is in possession of
the original deposition, to attach the deposition as an exhibit to the motion,
along with the original court reporter's certificate. 220 Another method is for
an attorney, who has only a copy or wishes to rely on excerpts, to attach
copies of the deposition pages to the motion or response, along with the
court reporter's certificate and his or her affidavit certifying the truthfulness
and correctness of the copied material. Importantly, the court held that sim-
ply quoting portions of the deposition in a motion or response is not
sufficient.2 2'
Two cases considered certain procedural questions related to summary
213. Id. at 940.
214. Id. at 942.
215. Id.
216. See 1988 Annual Survey, supra note 2.
217. TEX. R. Civ. P. 206.
218. Id. 166a(c).
219. 758 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
220. Id. at 610.
221. Id. at 609.
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judgment motions. Goswami v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Association 222
concerned the propriety of an amendment to the pleadings during a sum-
mary judgment contest. Rule 63,223 which governs the filing of amend-
ments, provides that the parties to an action may amend their pleadings as a
matter of right until "within seven days of the date of trial." Holding that a
hearing on a motion for summary judgment is a trial within the meaning of
rule 63,224 the supreme court concluded that an amended petition submitted
four days before a summary judgment hearing required leave of court to be
filed.225 Nevertheless, the court stated that since the amended petition was
before the trial court at the time of the hearing and the summary judgment
recited "that all pleadings on file were considered," leave of court would be
presumed. 226
Lynch v. Bank of Dallas2 2 7 considered a question related to the sufficiency
of notice of a summary judgment motion hearing. Rule 166228 provides that
a party must file a motion at least twenty-one days before the time specified
for hearing. Rule 2 1a229 specifies that service by mail is complete upon de-
posit of the pleading with the post office or its official depository. The same
rule also provides that when a party is required to take some action within a
prescribed period and is served with a pleading by mail, three days shall be
added to the prescribed period. 230 In Lynch the appellant, against whom
summary judgment had been granted, argued that the foregoing provisions
require twenty-four days notice of a summary judgment hearing when ser-
vice of the motion was made by mail. Disagreeing with that contention, the
appellate court held that notice was sufficient when the motion and notice of
the date of hearing were deposited in the mail twenty-one days prior to the
hearing date, excluding, however, in the computation the date of service and
the date of the hearing. 2
3 1
Finally, in City of Beaumont v. Guillory232 the supreme court discussed
issues related to appeal from an order granting a motion for partial summary
judgment. In this case, the trial court entered an order granting a motion for
partial summary judgment in favor of a defendant, but the order did not
expressly resolve all issues in this case not decide all matters between all
parties. In particular, the order did not dispose of a claim between defend-
222. 751 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1988).
223. TEX. R. Civ. P. 63.
224. 751 S.W.2d at 490; accord Claude Regis Vargo Enter., Inc. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d
524, 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mainland Say. Ass'n
v. Wilson, 545 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Bruce v.
McAdoo, 531 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Jones v. Houston
Materials Co., 477 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ);
Leche v. Stautz, 386 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Goswami, 751 S.W.2d at 490.
226. Id.
227. 746 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
228. TEX. R. Civ. P. 116a(c).
229. Id. 21a.
230. Id.
231. Lynch, 746 S.W.2d at 25.
232. 751 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1988).
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ant and a third party defendant. Apparently, however, the order related to a
critical issue that was effectively dispositive of the claim between plaintiff
and defendant. Nonetheless, the supreme court held that the order was not
final and, therefore, not appealable. 233 In this regard, the court noted that a
summary judgment, unlike a judgment signed after a trial on the merits, is




As discussed elsewhere in this article,235 the supreme court in Willis v.
Maverick 236 applied the discovery rule in determining when the statute of
limitations begins to run in a legal malpractice action. The court in that case
also discussed the form of jury issues under the discovery rule.2 3 7 In this
connection, the trial court submitted an issue inquiring as to when plaintiff
discovered that an agreement incident to a divorce contained a provision
allowing the sale of the marital home, which was the basis of her action
against her former attorney. 238 The supreme court held that the issue was
improperly worded and should have been phrased so to inquire as to when
plaintiff discovered "or should have discovered ... the facts establishing the
elements" of her claim. 239
The supreme court in Ludt v. McCullum 240 discussed the form of a dam-
age issue in a suit against a home builder for foundation problems. The
court recognized that in that type of suit, a successful plaintiff could recover
damages both for the cost of repairs and for permanent reduction of market
value that occurs notwithstanding the repairs. In this action, the jury issue
asked about the amount of cost of repairs and permanent reduction in
value. 24 1 The issue was defective, according to the supreme court, because it
requested the jury to find the permanent reduction in value "at the present
time," rather than at the point in time after the repairs were made. 24 2
Numerous courts of appeals have also considered the form of special is-
sues. In a fraud case, the trial court in Voskamp v. Arnoldy243 submitted an
issue inquiring as to whether defendant had misrepresented "or" concealed
certain material facts. Rejecting defendant's contention that the issue was
multifarious, the appellate court noted that an issue is not multifarious be-
cause it groups several facts together so long as it involves one ultimate is-
sue. 244 Since concealment and misrepresentation are two different ways of
233. Id. at 492.
234. Id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30.
236. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
237. Id. at 647.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 762 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1988).
241. Id. at 576.
242. Id.
243. 749 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ).
244. Id. at 118-19.
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accomplishing fraud, the court found that the special issue was proper as it
inquired into the single ultimate question of fraud. 245
In Rio Grande Land & Cattle Co. v. Light 246 a group of cattle producers
brought an action against the owners and operators of a feed lot, alleging
wrongful conduct in the housing and feeding of their cattle. At the conclu-
sion of the evidence at trial, the court presented an issue to the jurors regard-
ing several acts of alleged misconduct by defendants, but the damage issue
simply asked for the amount of money that would compensate each plaintiff
for his damage, which the jury had found resulted from defendant's ac-
tions.247 Appealing from an adverse judgment, defendants contended that
the form of the damage issue was improper because it was impossible to
determine what acts the jury's award was based upon or if the required
number of jurors had agreed on the acts that caused plaintiffs' losses. Dis-
agreeing with those contentions, the court of appeals reasoned that, first, the
language of the issues instructed the jurors to award damages that resulted
from wrongful acts found by them to be the proximate cause of plaintiffs'
losses and, second, whether defendant committed more than one type of mis-
conduct was of no consequence as it would not affect the amount of
damages.248
Finally, in Pogue v. First State Bank Monahans,249 a case involving a de-
fense of estoppel, the jury found that appellee had not made a false represen-
tation. Inadvertently ignoring an instruction that informed them not to
answer remaining issues after that finding, the jurors also found that appel-
lant did not rely on the representation. In a subsequent appeal, the appellant
attacked the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the answer to the issue
about the falsity of the appellee's representation. Based on the jury's finding
of a lack of reliance, and even though the jury should not have made that
finding under the trial court's instruction, the court of appeals held that any
lack of evidence regarding the falsity of the representation was harmless. 250
XI. JURY PRACTICE
Three decisions during the Survey period considered issues related to the
selection of a jury. Babcock v. Northwest Memorial Hospital251 concerned
the propriety of a trial court's refusal to allow a plaintiff's attorney, during
voir dire, to question the panel about the lawsuit crisis. In this medical mal-
practice case, plaintiff's counsel was precluded from asking the panel during
voir dire about the liability crisis, apparently referring to the proposition that
the increasing number of personal injury lawsuits and excessive jury awards
had caused a crisis. In presenting his request to the trial court, plaintiff's
245. Id. at 119.
246. 749 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-San Antonio), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 758 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1988).
247. Id. at 210.
248. Id. at 211.
249. 750 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ).
250. Id. at 827.
251. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 146 (Dec. 14, 1988).
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counsel specifically stated that he did not want to question the jury about
insurance. On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiff's counsel to question ju-
rors about the alleged " 'lawsuit crisis.' ",252
In reaching that result, the supreme court noted that the trial court should
allow broad latitude to a litigant during the voir dire examination. 253 Ac-
cording to the court, a trial judge abuses his discretion, as here, when his
refusal to allow a question during voir dire prevents a litigant from deter-
mining whether grounds exist to challenge a prospective juror for cause or
denies his intelligent use of peremptory challenges. 254 It remains unclear,
however, to what extent a litigant may raise the subject of insurance, such as
increasing premiums, in the context of discussing a liability crisis.
During voir dire in S & A Beverage Co. v. Derouen 25 a prospective juror
asked the trial judge whether there was dram shop insurance in this state,
which defendant, a tavern owner, contended was prejudicial. The court of
appeals disagreed, however, holding that the mention of insurance during
voir dire does not always require a reversal and the complainant must show
that it probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.256 Other
than reciting the mention of insurance, the appellants did not attempt to
show the juror's question lead to an improper judgment and, accordingly,
the court overruled the point. 257
Mendoza v. Ranger Insurance Co.258 presented a unique question regard-
ing procedures for selection of a jury panel. In this case, the evidence at a
hearing on a motion for new trial revealed that, in Tarrant County, persons
who postpone their jury service are placed on a transfer list. Not surpris-
ingly, teachers are often granted transfers during the months of March
through May. In turn, the names of persons placed on the transfer list are
not mixed or shuffled prior to the first assignment to a court. 259
The trial in this case was in early June 1987 and, as might be expected
from the foregoing, the venire panel contained a large number of teachers.
Ten of the twenty-one prospective jurors were teachers. At the conclusion of
voir dire and prior to the impaneling of the jury, appellant moved for a mis-
trial and requested that a new panel of prospective jurors be drawn because a
disproportionate number of jurors had the same occupation. Agreeing with
appellant's position, the court of appeals determined that appellant was de-
nied the right to a trial before an impartial jury fairly representative of the
community.26o
Pursuant to rule 606(b) 261 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence and Proce-
252. Id. at 149.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 753 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
256. Id. at 512, 513.
257. Id. at 512.
258. 753 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
259. Id. at 780.
260. Id. at 781.
261. TEX. R. EvID. 606(b).
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dural rule 327,262 evidence of jury misconduct, as a ground for a new trial,
may not consist of matters or statements that occur during the jury's deliber-
ation, nor of testimony as to the effect of anything that might influence a
juror's thought process in reaching a decision. One exception to the forego-
ing rule is that a juror may testify as to whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.263 Two cases considered the
scope of the outside influence exception.
In Baley v. W/W Interests2 6 4 the court of appeals took a very restrictive
view of the exception. In this wrongful death case, appellant claimed,
among things, that: (1) two jurors had visited the scene of the victim's death
and related their experience to other jurors; (2) the jurors discussed a news-
paper article that was not in evidence; (3) the jurors discussed the case
among themselves prior to the conclusion of the evidence; (4) two jurors
stated that they did not believe in awarding money damages; and (5) one of
the jurors allowed others to vote for her. Although recognizing that such
conduct was unquestionably improper, the court of appeals held that the
jurors' testimony about the foregoing was inadmissible.265 In this regard,
the court rejected the appellant's argument that such conduct did not occur
during the juror's deliberations because it occurred before the charge was
read and during lunch or coffee breaks. According to the court, any conver-
sation regarding the case among jurors is part of jury deliberations. 26 6 The
court also held that, to constitute outside influence, a non-juror must supply
the information. 267 Information gathered by a juror and introduced to other
jurors is not an outside influence. 26 8 Finally, in H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v.
Paez 269 the court held that a trial court's response to a jury's question during
deliberation, which allegedly caused a change in votes, did not constitute an
outside influence.
XII. JUDGMENT, DISMISSAL AND MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. 270 the United States Supreme
Court held that prior Texas law, 2 7 1 which required a showing of a meritori-
ous defense in order to set aside a default judgment, contravened the due
process rights of a defendant who challenged the sufficiency of service of
process upon him. Two Texas cases considered the application of Peralta to
other situations. In Lopez v. Lopez272 a defendant was not notified of a trial
setting and, thus, did not appear for trial. After judgment was entered, the
262. TEx. R. Civ. P. 327.
263. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b).
264. 754 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
265. Id. at 315.
266. Id. at 316.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 742 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
270. 108 S. Ct. 896, 99 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1988).
271. E.g., Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d, 124, 126
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1939, opinion adopted).
272. 757 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. 1988).
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defendant sought a new trial, but did not allege or prove a meritorious de-
fense in connection with his motion for new trial. Relying on Peralta, the
supreme court held that a meritorious defense was not required to be shown
in order for the defendant to obtain a new trial. 273 On the other hand, in
Richmond Manufacturing Co. v. Fluitt274 the defendant who sought to set
aside a default judgment was properly served with process. Under those
circumstances, the court of appeals held that requiring the defendant to al-
lege facts supporting a meritorious defense was not unconstitutional nor con-
trary to the Peralta holding.27 5
A number of cases addressed the right of a trial court to dismiss an action
for want of prosecution when the parties had not received notice of intent to
dismiss under rule 165a. 276 In Collier Manufacturing & Supply v. InterFirst
Bank Austin,27 7 a garnishment action, the garnishor and garnishee had
agreed to pass a trial setting, but had failed to notify the court of their agree-
ment. After they failed to appear for the trial setting at which the judgment
debtor was present, the trial court dismissed the action without further no-
tice. Although recognizing that a trial court may dismiss a case for want of
prosecution based on rule 165a or on its inherent equitable power to control
its docket, the court of appeals decided that the dismissal was erroneous
without prior notice of intent to take that action. 278 In analogous situations,
the courts in Vautrain v. Dutch Garrett, Inc. 279 and Knight v. Trent 280 held
that the lack of notice was not fatal because the trial courts in those cases
conducted a hearing on a motion to reinstate the action after dismissal.
Finally, in Ryals v. Canales 281 the trial court signed a judgment dismissing
an action against some of the defendants based on a settlement and severed
plaintiff's claims against those defendants from the remainder of the action.
Subsequently, the district clerk gave the severed action a new cause number,
but the court rendered no new judgment under the new number. The trial
court thereafter set aside the judgment, an action which was only timely and
proper under rule 329b 282 if the original judgment was not final at the time
of its signing. Reviewing under a petition for writ of mandamus, the court of
appeals held that for appellate purposes the primary concern is whether the
judgment resolves all issues and rights of all the parties.283 The court held
that because the judgment disposed of all the issues between the parties, it
was final when signed and that the clerical function of assigning a second
cause number was a purely ministerial act. 284 As such, the court held that
273. Id. at 723.
274. 754 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
275. Id. at 360.
276. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a.
277. 749 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
278. Id. at 564.
279. 755 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
280. 739 S.W.2d 116, 119 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
281. 748 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.




the judgment was final for appellate purposes and that the trial judge had
erred in setting it aside after his plenary jurisdiction had expired. 28 5
XIII. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. The Record on Appeal
Prior to its amendment, appellate rule 54286 required the appellant in any
case in which either party made a timely motion for new trial or modifica-
tion of the judgment to file the transcript and statement of facts in the appel-
late court within one hundred days after the trial judge signed the judgment.
The appellant in those circumstances, however, could wait until ninety days
after judgment before even requesting preparation of the statement of
facts.2 87 As a result, appellants frequently asked appellate courts to grant
extensions of time to file the record although they had waited to file a request
for preparation of the statement of facts until 10 days before the record filing
date.288
Although the court in Sumner & Greener v. Carlson 289 described the ques-
tion as troubling, it nevertheless felt compelled under those circumstances to
grant a motion for an extension. 290 According to the court, a request for
statement of facts made within the time prescribed by the rule is timely as a
matter of law.29 1 Therefore, if the appellant cannot file the statement of
facts within the deadline established by rule 54(a) due to the reporter's work-
load, an extension is mandatory.29 2 The court cautioned, however, that a
late request to the court reporter may prevent the court of appeals from
allowing any extension. 293 The subsequent decision in Sifuentes v. Texas
Employers' Insurance Association 294 proved that the Carlson warning was
anything but idle.
In Sifuentes appellant filed a motion for extension six days before the
statement of facts was due in the court of appeals. Two weeks later, the
court denied the motion on the basis it was defective because appellant's
written request to the reporter for the statement of facts was late, and the
motion did not reasonably explain the untimeliness of that request.
29 5
285. Id. at 604, 606.
286. TEX. R. App. P. 54(a).
287. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(1) (time for perfecting appeal is ninety days after judgment
if timely motion for new trial is filed); TEX. R. App. P. 53(a) (appellant need not request
preparation of statement of facts until at or before time prescribed for perfecting appeal).
288. Due to the recurring nature of this problem, rule 54 was amended, effective January 4,
1988, to allow the statement of facts to be filed 120 days after the judgment is signed if a timely
filed motion for new trial has been filed by any party. TEX. R. App. P. 54.
289. 739 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
290. Id. at 129.
291. Id.
292. Id. The court concluded that a reporter's workload is a reasonable explanation within
the meaning of TEX. R. App. P. 54(c). 739 S.W.2d at 129.
293. Id.
294. 754 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
295. Id. at 787. TEx. R. App. P. 54(c) provides that a motion for extension to file the
statement of facts shall reasonably explain any delay in making the request to the reporter for
preparation of the statement of facts required under TEX. R. App. P. 53(a).
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Although the court denied the motion without prejudice, appellant waited
two additional weeks before filing a second, "amended" motion for extension
that ostensibly cured the defects existing in his original motion. By that
time, the jurisdictional period for seeking an extension had expired. 296 Ap-
pellant argued, however, that the court's first order, denying his original mo-
tion for extension without prejudice, meant that he had fifteen days from the
date of that order to file a corrected motion.
The court disagreed, holding that the denial of the first motion because of
a formal but waivable defect in the motion did not operate in any way to
extend the time to file a second, corrected motion.297 According to the
court, it could not by order extend its jurisdiction beyond the limit estab-
lished by law.2 9 8 Because the court had denied appellant's first motion, it
was no longer a "live" pleading subject to amendment. 2 99 Thus, appellant's
corrected motion constituted a second motion for extension, governed by the
jurisdictional time limits imposed by rule 54(c). 300
Darley v. Texas Utavan, Inc. 301 involved a suit tried under the pilot pro-
gram established by the supreme court 30 2 that allows certain Dallas district
courts to tape record proceedings in lieu of using a traditional court stenog-
rapher. In accordance with the supreme court's order, the statement of facts
on appeal from a suit in the pilot program consists of the cassette recordings,
a copy of the typewritten and original logs filed in the case by the court
reporter, and all of the exhibits together with a list of such exhibits in numer-
ical order and a brief identifying description of each. 303 Although appellant
Darley filed all of these items in the appellate court, Utavan moved to dis-
miss the appeal on the basis that Darley had failed to timely request and file
the statement of facts pursuant to rules 53(a) and 54.304
At the center of the dispute was Darley's motion for an extension of time
to file his brief. Section 5 of the supreme court's order30 5 requires each party
to file with his brief an appendix containing a written transcription of all
portions of the recorded statement of facts relevant to the appeal. Accord-
ingly, Darley requested the court reporter to transcribe the entire proceeding
for his appendix. When the backlogged court reporter could not complete
the transcription by the deadline for appellant's brief, Darley filed a timely
motion for extension of time to file his brief. In response, however, Utavan
moved to dismiss the entire appeal arguing that the appendix was an integral
296. TEX. R. ApP. P. 54(c) permits a party to file a motion for extension up to fifteen days
after the date specified for filing the record.
297. Sifuentes, 754 S.W.2d at 788.
298. Id. See Anderson v. Casebolt, 493 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1973) (per curiam) (trial
court may not by order enlarge jurisdictional period for perfecting appeal); TEX. R. ApP. P.
2(a).
299. Sifuentes, 754 S.W.2d at 787.
300. Id. at 788.
301. 741 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
302. Order of the Supreme Court of Texas, 741 S.W.2d 204 (January 8, 1986).
303. Id. § 3, at 205.
304. TEX. R. Ap. P. 53(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 54.
305. Order of the Supreme Court of Texas § 5, 741 S.W.2d 204 (January 8, 1986).
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part of the statement of facts and, therefore, Darley was required to file a
motion for extension of time to file the appendix in accordance with the time
periods established by rule 54(c). 306 Utavan argued that under rule 54(c),
Darley's motion for an extension of time to file the statement of facts had to
be filed by March 12, but was not filed until April 24. In effect, Utavan
argued that Darley was seeking an extension of time to file his brief when in
fact he should have been seeking an extension of time to file the statement of
facts.
The court easily dispensed with Utavan's motion, holding that the appen-
dix required by the supreme court's order was not a part of the statement of
facts since, pursuant to that order, the statement of facts consists only of the
audio tape, the reporter's certification, and the log.30 7 Since the audio tape,
reporters' certification, and log had been filed on March 10, no extension of
time to file the statement of facts was necessary.30 8 The court had greater
difficulty with Darley's request for an extension of time in which to file his
brief.3° 9 Although the court acknowledged that an extension is the correct
remedy when more time is needed to prepare the appendix, 3 10 the court
noted that Darley had failed to prove the need for more time since he did not
establish that someone other than the presiding court reporter could not pre-
pare the transcription. 3 1' The court further held that Darley had failed to
make the required showing that a transcription of the entire recorded pro-
ceeding was necessary for his appeal. 31 2 Nevertheless, the court excused the
absence of these showings, and granted Darley's requested extension on the
basis that both parties were confused about the requirements imposed by the
supreme court's order. 3 13
In a subsequent opinion in the same case, the Dallas court of appeals
wrestled with additional issues involving the record on appeal in lawsuits
from the pilot program. 31 4 The trial court's log showed that the trial of the
suit lasted two days, but the tapes delivered to the court of appeals included
only the proceedings had on the first day of the trial. Darley therefore as-
serted that he was entitled to a new trial because the statement of facts from
the second day of trial had been lost. 3
15
306. TEX. R. App. P. 54(c) requires a party to file a motion for extension to file the state-
ment of facts within 15 days after the deadline for such statement of facts. According to
Utavan, the rule applied because the supreme court's order does not change any of the other
filing deadlines set forth in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Order of the Supreme
Court of Texas § 4, 741 S.W.2d 204 (January 8, 1986).
307. Darley, 741 S.W.2d at 202.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 203.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 203-204. The court observed that the supreme court's order does not mandate
that the presiding reporter prepare the transcription. Id. at 203. Thus, that reporter's backlog
is insufficient justification for an extension absent a showing why someone else could not timely
prepare a transcription. Id.
312. Id. at 204.
313. Id.
314. Darley v. Texas Utavan, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
315. TEX. R. App. P. 50(e) provides that unless the parties agree on a statement of facts the
appellant is entitled to a new trial when he has made a timely request for a statement of facts,
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The court disagreed, holding that Darley had failed to meet his burden
under rule 50316 of providing a record on appeal which supported his claim
that a portion of the statement of facts had been lost or destroyed.317 In this
connection, Darley had filed with the appellate court an affidavit showing
only his frustrated telephone attempts to obtain tapes of the proceedings
from an audio librarian who was not shown to be the official court reporter.
The court was unable to conclude, therefore, whether any part of the state-
ment of facts had actually been lost or destroyed. 318 Moreover, the court
noted that a party seeking a new trial on the basis of a lost or destroyed
record must first have made a timely request for the statement of facts. 319
That request must be in writing, directed to the official reporter, and specifi-
cally designate the portion of the evidence and other proceedings to be in-
cluded in the statement of facts.320 According to the court, because Darley's
telephone conversations with the audio librarian failed all three parts of the
test, he had not demonstrated that it was impossible to obtain some portion
of the statement of facts that he properly requested.321
Finally, in Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co. ,322
the court held that the parties could not supplement the record on appeal
with seven deposition transcripts that had not been on file with the trial
court at the time it ruled on a motion for summary judgment. All seven of
the depositions were taken prior to the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, and the court reporter's certificates were on file with the district
clerk at the time of the hearing. In addition, some of the summary judgment
motions and responses contained excerpts from the depositions attached as
exhibits. The court could find no indication, however, that the entire deposi-
tions themselves had ever been filed with the clerk's office.323 Further, the
court declined to treat as filed the excerpts of the depositions attached to the
motions or responses because the parties had failed to properly authenticate
those excerpts by affidavit. 324 Consequently, the court denied the motions
for leave to supplement the record even though all parties on appeal had
and the court reporter's notes and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant's
fault.
316. TEX. R. ApP. P. 50(d).
317. Darley, 754 S.W.2d at 306.
318. Id.
319. Id.; TEX. R. ApP. P. 50(e).
320. Darley, 754 S.W.2d at 306; TEx. R. ApP. P. 53(a).
321. Darley, 754 S.W.2d at 306 (citing Castillo v. State, 733 S.W.2d 560, 561-62 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1987, no pet.)).
322. 758 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
323. Indeed, the record indicated that the clerk, relying on amended TEX. R. Civ. P.
206(1), had declined to file the entire transcripts and accepted only the court reporter's certifi-
cates for filing.
324. Deerfield, 758 S.W.2d at 610. The court spelled out the procedure for properly plac-
ing depositions before the court as summary judgment evidence. According to the court, a
party relying on the entire deposition can attach the original transcript to his motion as an
exhibit together with the original court reporter's certificate for authentication. Id. If a copy,
or only a portion of the deposition, is to be used, the party should attach the copy or excerpts
to the motion along with a copy of the court reporter's certificate and an affidavit certifying the
truthfulness and correctness of the copied material. Id.
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agreed that the depositions should be included in the record. 325
B. Briefs
An appellant is required in his brief (1) to state each point upon which an
appeal is predicated,3 26 (2) to refer parenthetically after each such point to
the page of the record where the matter complained about is located, 327 and
(3) to include in his argument a statement of the pertinent facts and a discus-
sion of the authorities relied upon to maintain the point at issue. 328 Rule 74
permits the court to require rebriefing of the case for flagrant violations of
these briefing requirements. 329 In Tatum v. Liner330 the court enforced
these rules with a vengeance, holding that an appellant had waived several of
his points of error by failing to abide by the briefing rules.
In his brief, appellant simply listed two of his seventeen points of error
without any argument. Determining that this flagrantly violated rule 74, the
court concluded that it was not bound to consider the points at all.33' Since
the points were unbriefed and did not refer to any alleged error in the record,
the court held they were not actual points of error.332 The court also ob-
served that, notwithstanding the admonitory language of rule 74(p), it would




Mandamus procedures remained the subject of judicial scrutiny during
the survey period. Most notable was the decision in Smith v. Caldwell,334 in
which the court focused upon the certification requirements for exhibits to a
petition for mandamus. In Smith relator sought a writ of mandamus di-
recting the trial court to vacate his order denying a plea in abatement and to
grant a motion to dismiss the suit. A certified copy of the order denying the
plea in abatement and uncertified copies of various pleadings filed in two
competing actions accompanied relator's petition. Relator's attorney veri-
fied the petition and his affidavit stated that all of the exhibits were true and
correct copies of documents filed or served in the respective lawsuits. The
court concluded that the exhibits did not need to be certified in order to meet
the requirements of rule 121335 since they were properly verified by relator's
attorney. 336 In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized to a decision
325. Id.




330. 749 S.W.2d 251, 259 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
331. Id. at 260.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. 754 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
335. TEX. R. App. P. 121(a)(2)(C) requires that a certified or sworn copy of the order
complained of and any other relevant exhibits accompany a petition for mandamus.
336. Caldwell, 754 S.W.2d at 694.
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under the summary judgment rule 337 in which the supreme court had held
that copies of documents attached to a properly prepared affidavit were
sworn copies. 338 The court also noted that relator's attorney was empow-
ered to sign the required affidavit pursuant to rule 14. 339
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Disqualification of Judges
Rule 18a, 340 which governs the disqualification of judges, provides that
upon the filing of a motion to disqualify, the judge to whom the motion is
directed is required to either recuse himself or refer the motion to the presid-
ing judge of the district for hearing prior to any further proceedings in the
case. 341 Although the appellant in Feist v. Sekaly342 had filed a motion to
disqualify the trial judge, the trial court simply ignored the motion and con-
tinued to conduct proceedings in the case, ultimately entering a summary
judgment against the appellant. On appeal, Sekaly argued that the court's
failure to follow rule 18a was harmless since the summary judgment was
well taken as a matter of law. Following a long and unbroken line of earlier
decisions, 343 the court held that the requirements of rule 18a are
mandatory. 344 Consequently, the trial judge's failure to comply with the
rule required reversal. 345
State v. Preslar346 involved a motion to disqualify of a different sort. Ap-
parently due to his overcrowded docket, the trial judge in Preslar requested
the presiding judge of the district to appoint a visiting judge to try the case.
The presiding judge, in turn, asked Chief Justice Hill of the supreme court to
assign Judge Preslar, a retired appellate judge, to the case. Upon learning of
Judge Preslar's assignment, one of the parties filed a written objection seek-
ing to disqualify him pursuant to section 74.053 of the Government Code.347
After this motion was ignored, the same party brought an original manda-
mus proceeding challenging Judge Preslar's assignment on two bases. First,
relator argued that Chief Justice Hill exceeded his authority in appointing
Preslar, who resided in the trial court's district, since the chief justice of the
supreme court may only assign a visiting judge to district courts outside the
337. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
338, Caldwell, 754 S.W.2d at 693. See Republic Nat'l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717
S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986).
339. Caldwell, 754 S.W.2d at 693. TEX. R. Civ. P. 14 provides: "Whenever it may be
necessary or proper for any party... to make an affidavit, it may be made by .. his attorney."
340. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
341. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a(c).
342. 739 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
343. See, e.g., McLeod v. Harris, 582 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. 1979); Petitt v. Lawrence, 715
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez,
659 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
344. Feist, 739 S.W.2d at 492.
345. Id.
346. 751 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1988).
347. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (Vernon 1988) provides that a judge assigned to
hear a case pursuant to subsection (a) of the statute is disqualified if any party files a timely
objection to the assignment.
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administrative region in which the retired judge resides. Second, relator ar-
gued that his timely objection to the assignment disqualified Judge Preslar
from hearing the case.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed on both counts. 348 According to the
court, section 74 authorizes the chief justice to assign judges from one ad-
ministrative region to service in a different region.349 The court contrasted
the Chief Justice's authority with that of the presiding judge of an adminis-
trative region, who has the authority to assign judges residing within that
region.3 50  Although the court acknowledged that the chief justice can,
under certain limited circumstances, make assignments within an adminis-
trative region as if he were the presiding judge of that region,35 1 the court
found that none of those exceptional circumstances existed in the case. 352
The court also held that relator was entitled to object to the visiting judge
under section 74.053, thereby rejecting the respondents' argument that the
statute's objection provision had been repealed. 353 Following a lengthy anal-
ysis and discussion of recent statutory amendments, 354 the court held the
70th Legislature had not repealed, but only amended section 74.053 to per-
mit each party to the case only one objection to a visiting judge assigned
under chapter 74 of the Government Code.355
B. Disqualification of Counsel
One case decided during the survey period is of profound significance to
large law firms attempting to avoid ethical conflicts occasioned by the rou-
tine practice of lateral hiring. In Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall,356 a
case of first impression in Texas, the court held that when an attorney in
private practice has actual knowledge of the confidences of a former client in
a particular case, and he thereafter undertakes employment with a law firm
representing an adverse party in the same case, the entire new firm must be
disqualified from the litigation.357 The case arose when Cowles & Thomp-
son, representing the defendant in the suit, hired an attorney associated with
the Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, the firm representing plaintiff. Mind-
ful of the potential ethical ramifications of its hiring decision, Cowles &
Thompson constructed an elaborate "Chinese Wall"358 designed to exclude
348. Preslar, 751 S.W.2d at 479.
349. Id. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 74.002, 74.057 (Vernon 1988).
350. 751 S.W.2d at 479; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.056 (Vernon 1988).
351. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.049 (Vernon 1988) empowers the chief justice to act for
the presiding judge, and make assignments within an administrative region, if the presiding
judge is incapacitated, dies, resigns, or disqualifies himself.
352. Preslar, 751 S.W.2d at 479.
353. Id. at 482.
354. See Act of May 21, 1987, ch. 148, § 2.93(b)(4), Tex. Gen. Laws 1064, 1178; Act of
June 17, 1987, ch. 505, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 4223; Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 674, § 2.14,
Tex. Gen. Laws 5017, 5036.
355. Preslar, 751 S.W.2d at 482.
356. 751 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
357. Id. at 301.
358. A "Chinese wall" is a device used by a law firm to quarantine a new member with
confidential information received from an adversary of one of the firm's clients. In Petroleum
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the newly-hired attorney from any participation in the lawsuit and to pre-
vent any exchange of the client's shared confidences between the new attor-
ney and existing Cowles & Thompson attorneys involved in the litigation.
Notwithstanding these precautions, the court held that erection of the Chi-
nese wall could not rebut the presumption of shared confidences since the
newly-hired attorney was in private practice and had actual knowledge of his
former client's confidences in relation to the suit.359 More importantly, the
court held that even an effective Chinese wall would be insufficient to refute
the appearance of professional impropriety arising from the possible disclo-
sure of the former client's confidences. 36 Accordingly, the court concluded
that Cowles & Thompson's continued role in the case constituted a violation
of canon 9361 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, therefore, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the firm. 362
Commercial Credit and Control Data Corp. v. Wheeler 363 is a warning to
litigants who employ out-of-state practitioners to represent them in Texas
lawsuits. Section 81.102 of the Government Code364 provides that attorneys
licensed in other jurisdictions may practice law in the State of Texas only if
they comply with certain rules promulgated by the supreme court. Those
rules permit non-resident attorneys to practice in Texas if they (1) file a writ-
ten sworn motion requesting admission to practice in a particular court and
(2) associate a resident practicing attorney licensed in Texas who personally
participates in the trial or hearing.365 Counsel for the appellees in Wheeler
was a non-resident attorney who had failed to file the required motion and
never associated a resident attorney as co-counsel. The court therefore
struck appellees' briefs on the basis that their counsel was unlawfully prac-
ticing law in the State of Texas.366
C. Attorney Fees
In a case of first impression, the court in Gill Savings Association v. Inter-
Wholesale Cowles & Thompson erected such a "Chinese wall" by, among other things, remov-
ing litigation files to a storage room where they were maintained under lock and key, in-
structing the newly-hired attorney not to discuss the lawsuit with anyone, and ordering all of
its existing attorneys and staff not to mention the suit in the presence of the new attorney. Id.
at 296.
359. Id. at 300. The court was careful to limit its holding to the specific facts presented in
the case, and intimated that a different result might obtain if the newly-hired attorney was
formerly employed in the public sector or simply had imputed, rather that actual, knowledge
of the former client's confidences as a result of his employment by the former firm. Id. at 300-
301.
360. Id. at 301.
361. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. X,
§ 9 (Code of Professional Responsibility) Canon 9 (Vernon 1973 & Vernon Supp. 1988).
362. Petroleum Wholesale, 751 S.W.2d at 301-302.
363. 756 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
364. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.102(a)(b) (Vernon 1987).
365. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, rule XV(a) (1985).
366. Wheeler, 756 S.W.2d at 771. Nevertheless, the court declined to render judgment on
that basis alone in favor of appellant, who still carried the burden of demonstrating errors
committed by the trial court. Id.
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national Supply Co. 367 held that compensation for a legal assistant's work
may be separately assessed and included in the award of attorney's fees if the
legal assistant performs work that has traditionally been done by attorneys.
According to the court, requiring attorneys to perform tasks more suitably
performed by paralegals just to allow for the compensation of that time in
the event attorney's fees are ultimately awarded in the case would not serve
justice. 368 In order to recover paralegal's fees, however, the evidence must
establish: (1) that the legal assistant is qualified to perform the substantive
work; (2) the work was directed or supervised by an attorney; (3) the nature
of the work performed; (4) the hourly rate charged for the legal assistant;
and (5) the number of hours the legal assistant worked on the matter.3 69
D. Res Judicata
In Allied Bank v. Pleasant Homes, Inc. 370 the trial court reversed a default
judgment after determining that the plaintiff's claims were barred by res
judicata or the compulsory counterclaim rule.371 The court rejected plain-
tiff's argument that res judicata was an affirmative defense of which the de-
fendant could not avail itself by reason of its default. 37 2 According to the
court, the error was "apparent from the face of the record," and thus subject
to challenge by writ of error, since plaintiff's pleadings themselves conclu-
sively showed that his claims were barred.373
367. 759 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1988, no writ).
368. Id. at 704.
369. Id. at 702.
370. 757 S.W.2d 460, 461 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
371. TEX. R. Civ. P. 97(a).
372. Allied Bank, 757 S.W.2d at 462.
373. Id.
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